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WHY SIMPLE FOREKNOWLEDGE OFFERS NO 
MORE PROVIDENTIAL CONTROL THAN THE 
OPENNESS OF GOD 
John Sanders 
This paper examines the question of whether the theory of simply fore-
knowledge (SF) provides God with greater providential control than does 
the theory of present knowledge (PK). It is claimed by the proponents of SF 
that a deity lacking such knowledge would not be able to provide the sort 
of providential aid commonly thought by theists to be given by God. To see 
whether this is the case I first distinguish two different versions of how 
God's foreknowledge is accessed according to simple foreknowledge. These 
two versions are then utilized to examine seven different areas of divine 
providence to assess the utility of simple foreknowledge. I conclude that SF 
affords no greater providential control than PK. 
Does a God with simple foreknowledge (SF) possess greater providen-
tial control than a God with present knowledge (PK)? It is claimed by 
the proponents of SF that a deity lacking such knowledge would not be 
able to provide the sort of providential aid commonly thought by theists 
to be given by God. To see whether this is the case I first distinguish two 
different versions regarding how God's foreknowledge is accessed 
according to simple foreknowledge. These two versions are then utilized 
to examine seven separate areas of divine providence to asses the utility 
of simple foreknowledge. I conclude that SF affords no greater provi-
dential control than PK. 
Introduction 
According to the theory of simple foreknowledge God has direct 
vision of all future events. God does not cause all these events to hap-
pen, nor is his knowledge inferred from what has happened in the past. 
Rather, God has direct noninferential apprehension of the future. The 
foreknowledge God has of what creatures with libertarian freedom will 
do is dependent on, and logically subsequent to, what the creatures actu-
ally decide to do.] That is, what the creatures decide affects what God 
knows the future to be. "Once" God decided to create this world then 
God apprehended all that would ever happen-right down to the move-
ments of quarks-in this world. 
For the openness of God model, God has only present knowledge of 
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what free creatures do and only possesses "foreknowledge" of the spe-
cific actions he determines to do in the future. God knows all that has 
happened and all that is happening-right down to the movements of 
quarks-and may infer or believe that certain things will occur in the 
future. But God does not know the future actions of free creatures. 
Moreover, even how and if some of the divine intentions will be actual-
ized are not known in a hard sense since they depend upon God's reac-
tion to human decisions.' In the openness model God is understood to 
be responsive to the creatures he made. There is a give-and-take dynam-
ic between God and his creation. 
Some people are attracted to the element of divine responsiveness in 
the openness model but find two significant problems with the openness 
theory. First, they understand the nature of biblical prophecy to imply 
that God has foreknowledge of the future. If God has SF then, it is 
claimed, he can predict the future through his prophets. Second, they 
believe the open God model implies too much divine risk in providence 
such that God cannot guarantee the end from the beginning. A God 
lacking omniprescience cannot meet the challenges of the future. David 
Hunt claims that "divine control will be hamstrung and God's purposes 
jeopardized if events can ever catch Him by surprise, or find Him unpre-
pared, or force Him to react after the fact to patch things up .... the kind of 
providential control expected of a theistic God is possible only on the 
assumption of foreknowledge."3 Both of these problems are overcome, 
it is claimed, if God possesses SF. 
Theologian Jack Cottrell maintains that SF is a key element in God's 
providential control over the world. He says, 
Because it is by this means that God can allow man to be truly 
free in his choices, even free to resist his own special influences, 
and at the same time work out his own purposes infallibly. For 
if God foreknows all the choices that every person will make, he 
can make his own plans accordingly, fitting his purposes 
around these foreknown decisions and actions .... Acts 2:23 is a 
perfect illustration of the way God works through his fore-
knowledge .... On the one hand, God had predetermined that 
Jesus would die as a propitiation for the sins of the world; this 
was his own unconditional plan for saving the world. On the 
other hand, the details of how this would be accomplished were 
planned in relation to God's foreknowledge of the historical sit-
uation and of the character and choices of men such as Judas.4 
These are strong claims for the providential benefits of SF. Before 
examining the validity of these claims, I think it important to distin-
guish two different versions of how God's foreknowledge is accessed. 
SF is commonly explained as God "seeing the whole at once" and thus, 
knowing all that will happen. In this way God atemporally learns all at 
once everything that his free creatures will do. For example, God pre-
visioned before the creation of the world my birth, sibling rivalries, 
marriage, adoption of children, writing this paper, etc. What God pre-
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visioned, moreover, included all the details leading up to and sur-
rounding all these events-right down to the number of hairs on my 
head at any given moment. This vision of God happens all at once and 
even though he knows things will occur in sequence God does not 
acquire the knowledge in sequence. God simply sees the whole at 
once. I shall coin the term "Complete Simple Foreknowledge" (CSF) 
for this version of SF. 
Unfortunately, CSF has a difficult time explaining how God can 
intervene in what he foresees will happen. The problem arises because 
of the fact that what God previsions is what will actually occur. Divine 
foreknowledge, by definition, is always correct. If what will actually 
happen is, for example, the holocaust, then God knows it is going to 
happen and cannot prevent it from happening since his foreknowledge 
is never mistaken. Furthermore, if what God has foreseen is the entire 
human history at once, then the difficulty is to somehow allow for God's 
intervention into that history since, presumably, his prevision did not 
include his own actions.s For example, if God sees Abraham's birth, life 
and death all at once then how does God interject the test of the binding 
of Isaac (Gen. 22) into Abraham's life? How does God see God's own 
actions in Abraham's life which would alter Abraham's life and conse-
quently change God's foreknowledge? Even more seriously, if God 
sees all of human history and the sin involved in it, but not his own 
actions, then this foreknowledge does not include any redemption from 
sin and God cannot save the creatures he is about to create. Hunt is cor-
rect that a God "with total foreknowledge .. .is equipped to make maxi-
mally informed decisions-but there is nothing left to be decided."6 In 
this state of affairs there is no room for any providential activity if God 
sees the whole at once.7 This raises the specter of deism which is unac-
ceptable for orthodox theists. 
Not surprisingly some believers in SF have sought a different expla-
nation of God's direct apprehension of the future, one that allows for 
God to act providentially. In this version God timelessly accesses the 
future in sequence or incrementally.s That is, not in a temporal sequence, 
but in what might be called an explanatory order.9 God sort of atempo-
rally rolls the tape of the future up to a certain point and then stops it in 
order to interject his own actions into the tape and then rolls the tape 
further to see what his creatures will do in response to his actions. Then 
God again decides what he will do and then rolls the tape further. 
Hence, there is a logical sequence or order of dependence in the way 
God comes to access his foreknowledge. In this version God still learns 
the future, atemporally of course, but he learns it in sequence. As a 
result God can weave his own actions into the flow of human history. I 
shall coin the term "Incremental Simple Foreknowledge" (lSF) to desig-
nate this view. 
Does the theory of SF provide better support for the doctrine of provi-
dence than the openness model? I propose to examine seven different, 
but related, aspects of the doctrine of providence to see what benefits, if 
any, SF has over PK. 
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Providential Uses of SF 
1. Creation and Sin 
Some people believe that a God with SF could have prevented the 
free creatures from committing evil. Since God did not prevent sin from 
happening, God is ultimately responsible. John Hick takes this line 
when he says it is "hard to clear God from ultimate responsibility for the 
existence of sin, in view of the fact that He chose to create a being whom 
He foresaw would, if He created him, freely sin."l0 Lorenzo McCabe, a 
nineteenth century Methodist theologian who wrote two lengthy treat-
ments on foreknowledge, said that "a being who the Creator foreknew 
would be disobedient should not be created .... How easy for omnipo-
tence to prevent the existence of those who, as his omniscience foresaw, 
would choose to be disobedient."l1 Cottrell gives the background for 
this sort of providential control when he says, "It is foreknowledge that 
enables God to maintain complete control of his world despite the free-
dom of his creatures. God knows the future; it is not open or indefinite 
for him. This gives God the genuine option of either permitting or pre-
venting men's planned choices, and prevention is the ultimate control."12 
But can a God with CSF prevent sinners from being born or prevent 
certain evil choices? No, for the simple reason that if what God foreknows 
is the actual world then God foreknows the births, lives and deaths of 
actual sinners. Once God has foreknowledge he cannot change what 
will happen for that would make his foreknowledge incorrect. If God 
foreknows (has actual knowledge) that Adam will freely choose to mis-
trust God, then God cannot intervene to prevent Adam from this mis-
trust. Hence, God can see the evil coming before he creates the world 
but is powerless to prevent it. William Hasker is correct when he says, 
[I]t is clear that God's foreknowledge cannot be used either to 
bring about the occurrence of a foreknown event or to prevent 
such an event from occurring. For what God foreknows is not 
certain antecedents which, unless interfered with in some way, 
will lead to the occurrence of the event; rather, it is the event itself 
that is foreknown as occurring, and it is contradictory to sup-
pose that an event is known to occur but then also is prevented 
from occurring. In the logical order of dependence of events, 
one might say, by the "time" God knows something will hap-
pen, it is "too late" either to bring about its happening or to pre-
vent it from happeningY 
The proponent of SF may appeal to Incremental Simple 
Foreknowledge (ISF) in an attempt to rescue providential control. Thus, 
God roles the tape forward and learns (prior to creation) that Adam is 
succumbing to temptation-but does not role the tape far enough to see 
whether he actually sins or not. At this point God may press the pause 
button on his remote and decide to intervene in order to buttress 
Adam's flagging trust. Will God's efforts be successful? To find out 
God roles the tape forward to see how Adam will respond. 14 If Adam 
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chooses to continue to trust God then the temptation is overcome. If he 
fails to trust God then sin enters the world. Regardless, once God sees 
the actual future choice of the creature he is powerless to prevent it. 
Prior to the actual choice being made God can seek to persuade Adam to 
trust God, but once God knows that Adam will fail to trust God then it is 
too late for God to prevent the sin. 
It must be remembered that a God with SF (either CFS or ISF) does 
not have middle knowledge and so cannot "tryout" alternative scenar-
ios in order to ascertain which one will achieve his objective in prevent-
ing Adam from sinning.ls A God with SF knows what will occur in the 
actual world once he decides to create this world. But God does not 
know before he decides to create this particular world what sorts of 
decisions and actions a world containing individuals with libertarian 
freedom will freely choose to do if created. Consequently, a God with SF 
is no less a risk taker than a God with PK, for he could only gamble that 
a desirable state of affairs would actually come about. Hence, God is 
open to being surprised or disappointed by what he discovers will come 
about. Thus, a God with SF might "luck out" in that his free creatures 
never, in fact, decide to sin. But in this case there is no providential 
advantage for a God with SF over a God with PK. In fact, the way God 
providentially interacts with the world would be explained the same 
way in both models. 
2. Election 
What of all those God foreknew would never exercise saving faith in 
him and thus are not part of the elect of salvation? Can God decide not 
to create them? James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, thought so. 
'Think of a being," he says, "who would make a hell, who would create 
the race with the infallible foreknowledge that the majority of them were 
to be consigned to horrible and everlasting torment."16 Mill believed this 
a serious objection to the existence of the Christian God. 
Although this charge may carry some weight against theological 
determinism it does not apply to SF because it misunderstands the 
nature of foreknowledge. Early church fathers such as Justin Martyr and 
Origen set forth a view of election, much later taken up by Arminius, 
which sought to use SF without divine determinism.17 In their view God 
uses his foreknowledge to see which individuals will freely come to faith 
in Christ and God then decides to elect these people for eternal salva-
tion. Hence, God's election is dependent on, and logically subsequent 
to, the choice of the creatures even though God's election of them is tem-
porally prior to creation. God atemporally responds to the free choices of 
his creatures.18 
A God with SF takes risks in creating a world with libertarian free-
dom since it was possible, before God decided to create and had no fore-
knowledge of the actual world, that no single human being would love 
God. This is as true for the theory of SF as for PK. Even with SF God 
gains no more providential control over who is saved than a God with 
PK. Hence, even a God with SF could, once he decided to create, have 
learned through his foreknowledge that no humans would ever freely 
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come to love him in response to his love for them. As it has, in fact, 
turned out the actual world does, I believe, contain a number of people 
who respond in faith to the divine love. But, it must be remembered, 
this is not due to any providential use of his foreknowledge. One could 
say that God "lucked out," or one could say that God was confident and 
courageous enough to create a world where this tragic possibility exist-
ed but thankfully did not obtain. '9 Perhaps God had enough confidence 
in his ability to love the creatures and in his planned incarnation into 
human history that the risk was, from the divine point of view, worth 
taking if not minimal. 
3. Guidance and Protection 
It is often assumed that a God with SF would be in a maximally 
informed position to offer guidance and protection to those who petition 
him in prayer. For instance, say Mandie asks God whether she should 
marry Matthew or Jim, believing that God knows what is best for her 
and will advise her accordingly. In fact, Mandie may believe, with C. S. 
Lewis/o that a God with CSF knew of her prayer beforehand and so has 
prearranged things (perhaps even prior to her birth) in such a way that 
her request will be providentially answered. Mandie initiates her 
request in good faith believing that since God knows the future he can 
help her. She believes, for instance, that God knows whether Jim will be 
loving or abusive towards her. Perhaps God knows that Jim will turn 
out to be a drug dealer and quite abusive while Matthew will be a very 
loving person.21 Mandie believes that God would, in this case, give her 
the guidance to marry Matthew. The problem is that if God knows that 
she will actually marry Jim and be quite unhappy, then it is useless for 
God to give her the guidance to marry Matthew. It would be incoherent 
to claim that God, knowing the actual future and on the basis of this 
knowledge, changes it so that it will not be the actual future. Of course, 
God might foreknow that Jim will be a wonderful husband for Mandie. 
Even so, it is not because God brought it about. A God who already 
knows the future cannot answer such prayers. 
Furthermore, a God with CSF not only knows the "big" decisions 
Mandie will make, such as whom she will marry, but all the "little" ones 
leading up to and surrounding them as well. Hence, God knows all the 
details of her life as well as that of Jim's. If God sees that Mandie will be 
a very impatient person in the future God cannot act to bring it about 
that she become more patient than he foreknew. That is, God cannot 
work to improve her character so that it falsifies his knowledge of what 
he knew her character would be like. If God acts at all in her life it will, 
presumably, make an impact on her and so change her if ever so slight-
ly. But if God foreknows that such changes will never come about in her 
life then God is prohibited, by his foreknowledge, from acting in her life 
to improve her character. 
Perhaps we can again salvage SF from such dreadful conclusions by 
appealing to ISF. In this way God only accesses his foreknowledge up to 
the point where Mandie invokes God for guidance as to whom she 
should marry-but does not yet know whom she will actually marry. At 
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this juncture God is free to advise her, but his advice is limited to what 
he actually knows at present and what God surmises regarding the sorts 
of husbands Matthew and Jim might become. Remember, at this point in 
the tape God does not yet know the full development of their character 
traits. God may have very good beliefs about such matters which are vir-
tually (always?) correct. Yet, if this is the case then the advice a God with 
ISF is able to give Mandie is no different from the advice a God with PK 
is able to give. 
The same is true concerning prayers for protection. If God knows 
that I will be seriously injured in an auto accident on this particular trip, 
then no prayer for "travelling mercies" can alter this situation. 
Consequently, prayers for protection would be useless and any divine 
interventions prohibited. Only if God does not yet know the outcome of 
my journey can a prayer for safe traveling be coherent within the model 
of SF.22 If God decides to act in response to my prayer it cannot be based 
on his foreknowledge. Hence, this situation is no different from asking a 
God with PK for safety in traveling. 
4. Divine Repentance and Alternative Plans in the Divine-Human Dialogue 
It is commonly thought that a God with CSF cannot "change his 
mind" and will have no need of resorting to alternative plans in his 
interactions with humans. The biblical texts speaking of divine repen-
tance or alternative plans are taken to be simple anthropomorphisms. 
Thus one's view of foreknowledge deeply impacts the way one reads the 
biblical text. The story of Exodus 32 is a good case in point. In this story 
Moses has been up on the mountain for quite some time receiving the 
covenant from God. The people of Israel fashion and worship a golden 
calf which arouses the divine anger against their idolatry. God tells 
Moses to leave him alone so that he may destroy the people and begin 
his plan of human redemption over again-this time starting with 
Moses. Moses, however, does not agree with this "plan B" and so does 
not leave God alone. Instead, he intercedes for the people giving God 
three reasons why he should not carry out his threat. In response God 
"changed his mind (Hebrew Nacham) about the disaster that he planned 
to bring on his people" (32:14, NRSV). 
How does the theory of CSF interpret such texts? Throughout history 
many philosophers have thought that since God knew the future it was 
literally impossible for God to change his mind or respond to his crea-
tures in any way.23 Hence, Exodus 32:14 and the numerous other texts 
referring to divine repentance and alternative plans were interpreted to 
mean that from the human perspective God changed his mind, but God 
always knew he was not going to do what was threatened. Why, then, 
would God issue such threats? Some have suggested it is to teach Moses 
just how much Moses cared for the people of Israel. 
More problematic are texts such as 1 Samuel 2:30 where God revokes 
a promise made to the priest Eli and his household. "Therefore the 
LORD God of Israel declares: 'I promised that your family and the fami-
ly of your ancestor should go in and out before me forever'; but now the 
LORD declares: 'Far be it from me; for those who honor me I will honor, 
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and those who despise me shall be treated with contempt.'" God had 
made what appeared to be an unconditional promise to Eli for a perpet-
ual priesthood; now, however, God responds to the sin of Eli's sons by 
reneging on that promise. But if God always knew that he would never 
fulfill that promise then it is a serious question whether God made the 
promise with integrity. 
ISF affords a way out of this problem. By employing ISF, we can 
understand the text to mean that God genuinely intended to fulfill the 
promise because he did not know, "when" he made the promise, the 
future sins of Eli's sons. Once God "looked ahead" into the future then 
he learned of their sins and could then revoke the promise without 
being accused of mendacity. This interpretation of SF allows for God to 
change his mind, resort to a "plan B" and truly be responsive to his crea-
tures. A big plus for this view is that we are allowed to read the biblical 
texts in a more straightforward way-as God entering into genuine 
give-and-take relations with his creatures. Again, however, we see that 
such an interpretation is identical to how the openness model would 
explain such texts. 
5. Can God be Mistaken? 
Many people have thought that the divine perfection ruled out any 
possibility of God being wrong in any judgment. If God has knowledge 
rather than beliefs about the future then, of course, he cannot be mistak-
en about anything. Boethius said that "God sees everything in advance 
and cannot be deceived in any way."24 Augustine agreed saying, 
"Whoever says that anything can happen otherwise than as God has 
foreknown it, is attempting to destroy the divine foreknowledge with 
the most insensate impiety."25 Francis Beckwith has recently argued that 
a God with PK would base prophetic utterances not on his knowledge of 
the future but, rather, on his exhaustive knowledge of the past and pre-
sent. He rejects this notion because "this means that it is within the 
realm of possibility that God could make a mistake about the future."26 
If God can be mistaken about what will happen in the future then divine 
prophecies may be in doubt. 
These thinkers seem to affirm CSF where God accesses his knowledge 
of the future "all at once." In this version it is correct that God could 
never be mistaken about the future. But the major objection to this ver-
sion, as was mentioned above, is that it seems to render problematic any 
divine intervention into the history God foresees. Before leaving CSF it 
may be instructive to see how it would interpret a biblical text where 
one of God's predictions is called into question. 
The narrative of Moses' dialogue with God at the burning bush is fas-
cinating because Moses suggests the possibility that God might be mis-
taken. In Exodus chapter three God seeks to enlist Moses in the divine 
service. Moses is reluctant, however, and gives God five reasons why he 
is not the right man for the job. In 3:16-22 God instructs Moses to gather 
the elders of Israel together and inform them of their impending libera-
tion. Moreover, God explicitly says (v. 18) that the leaders will believe 
Moses. Perhaps Moses' understanding of divine foreknowledge was 
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inadequate for he replies to God, "But suppose they do not believe me 
or listen to me?" (4:1). God responds by giving Moses a "sign" to per-
form before the elders-his rod turns into a serpent. God then declares 
that the purpose of this sign is "so that they may believe that the 
LORD ... has appeared to you." (4:5). God then gives Moses a second 
sign-his skin becomes cancerous and is then healed (4:6-7). Amazingly, 
God then says, "If they will not believe you or heed the first sign, they may 
believe the second sign. If they will not believe even these two signs or 
heed you" (4:8-9) then here is a third sign. 
According to CSF Moses' question is ridiculous for God knows pre-
cisely what will happen in the future and if God says it then that is the 
way it is going to be. Moses' understanding of divine foreknowledge is 
erroneous (a genuine possibility). The passage should be interpreted to 
mean that God condescended to Moses' frailty and "played along" with 
him in order to give Moses greater confidence to undertake his mission. 
God knew they would believe but perhaps God also knew that they 
would only believe on the witness of the signs and so it is important for 
Moses to make this sort of request. The question remains, however, 
whether this interpretation does full justice to the statements "if they 
will not believe yoU.,,27 
On the other hand, if we go with ISF where God accesses his knowl-
edge of the future incrementally then we arrive at the astonishing con-
clusion that God could indeed be mistaken about the future. For in this 
view God does not know, at the time he is speaking with Moses, 
whether or not the elders will actually believe Moses. God may have a 
very good idea of their predisposition to believe but the possibility 
remains that God could be mistaken. Hence, on this view Moses' ques-
tion is quite appropriate and so are the signs given to Moses. 
Furthermore, the language of the biblical text retains its prima facie 
integrity. Yet, it must be acknowledged that this interpretation is in full 
agreement with a PK reading of the text. 
But this raises the possibility that some of God's predictions may be 
mistaken. Beckwith argues that the "test of a prophet" in Deuteronomy 
18:22 expressly rules out such a possibility: "If a prophet speaks in the 
name of the LORD but the thing does not take place or prove true, it is a 
word that the LORD has not spoken."28 If God says something will 
come to pass and it does not then the divine faithfulness and trustwor-
thiness of the prophets is called into question. The biblical writers wres-
tled with this issue, particularly regarding the divine repentance. In this 
regard, philosopher J. R. Lucas and biblical scholar Terence Fretheim 
agree that these are, indeed, "failed" prophecies precisely because God 
is the sort of God who changes his mind in response to prayers and con-
trition. 29 In fact, Jonah includes this idea in his creedal statement: 
Yahweh is a "gracious God and merciful, slow to anger, and abounding 
in steadfast love, and ready to relent (Hebrew Nacham) from punishing" 
(4:2). Both ISF and openness of God models are logically consistent with 
the notion of divine repentance and God being "mistaken". Of course, in 
a strict sense God would only be mistaken if he said a certain event 
would happen for sure and it did not come about. So long as God's 
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"failed" predictions are understood in the sense of, "God believed this 
would happen but it did not," then there may be no mistake here at all. 
6. Predictive Prophecy 
It is commonly thought that one of the strongest values of a God with 
SF is that he can know the actual future and so is able to inform his 
prophets beforehand what precisely will happen. This is thought to give 
evidence of divine revelation, accreditation to the prophet and, perhaps, 
influence the hearers of the prophecy to live their lives in accordance 
with the divine will. 
Biblical texts where God is said to "declare the end from the begin-
ning" (Isaiah 46:10) or specific predictions of events which then came 
about (e. g. Jesus' prediction of Peter's denial in Luke 22:31-4) are usual-
ly given as evidence that God has SF. Such texts can, of course, be 
explained by the other views of divine omniscience and do not necessi-
tate SF as an interpretation. 30 
There is a logical difficulty which makes this particular understand-
ing of predictive prophecy problematic with both CSF and ISF. As has 
already been shown CSF cannot be used as the means by which God 
predicts the future for the simple reason that, if God sees history "all at 
once" and, presumably, his actions were not foreseen, then God never 
foresees any prophets making predictions given by God. 
Moreover, it is probably clear by now why ISF cannot be used to pre-
dict (in the strong sense) the future. It must be remembered that explain-
ing SF as a logical sequence implies that God does not know precisely 
what is going to happen after the event he is foreseeing. If God learns as 
he previsions the future then it becomes impossible for God to interject 
something based on his knowledge of the future into the chemistry of 
past events which would alter his knowledge of what actually occurred 
in the past. For instance, if God foresees the whole of Jesus' life, he has 
not yet (logically speaking) foreseen the destruction of the Jerusalem 
temple in 70 A.D. Once God previsions the events of 70 A.D. it is "too 
late" for God to go back and reveal through Jesus a prediction about this 
event during the life of Jesus for God never foresaw Jesus uttering such 
a prediction. 
If God knows all the details and causal antecedents leading up to 
event Z and his prediction of event Z based on ISF was not part of this 
foreknowledge, then ISF is useless for predicting the future. For God to 
make a prediction of Z prior to the occurrence of Z would, presumably, 
change the course of history and alter some of the details which God 
foresees. Let us say that God·looks ahead and sees that the Babylonian 
invasion will happen and then God decides to reveal to Jeremiah that it 
will occur in the future. At a minimum, Jeremiah will now know some-
thing which he did not know when God first previsioned Jeremiah's life 
and words. That is, God "now" knows (logically) that he will provide to 
Jeremiah a prediction of event Z at time A, a future event which neither 
God nor Jeremiah knew about when God first previsioned time A since 
it was not part of his original foreknowledge. This would imply a 
change in the divine foreknowledge rendering the original foreknow 1-
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edge incorrect. 
Perhaps an illustration will help. Rajesh, wishing to make some 
money, may believe that a God with ISF would be in a position to 
inform him who will win the next Super Bowl and, if God should inform 
him, he could place his bet accordingly. Unfortunately, once God has 
"rolled the tape" up to the point where Rajesh makes his request, God 
does not yet know who the winner will be. And as God continues to pre-
vision the future he does not foresee his answer to Rajesh until after he 
previsions which team actually wins the next Super Bowl. By this time, 
however, it is too late for Rajesh to place his bet and it is "too late" for 
God to alter the past. This is the converse of the problem raised above in 
connection to divine guidance and miracles. In those cases the problem 
was that once God knows what will happen he cannot change it. In this 
case, once God knows the "past" (as he previsions it sequentially) he 
cannot change it. 
A God with ISF could, however, inform Rajesh which team he believes 
will win the next Super Bowl based upon his exhaustive knowledge of 
all the details available to his prevision at the time Rajesh makes his 
request. Of course, such a "prediction" will be no different from the sort 
of help a God with PK could give him. 
7. The Guarantee of the Success of God's plans 
It is felt by some proponents of SF that a key value is its ability to 
guarantee, from before creation, that God's plans would be successful. 
David Clark asserts that "foreknowledge could put God in a position to 
promise, with integrity, at the beginning of history, that good will over-
come evil."31 Clark believes that a weakness of the openness model is its 
inability to guarantee that God will ultimately eliminate evil. He claims 
that a God with PK cannot, while a God with SF can, affirm that God 
shall conquer evil triumphantly at the end of history while yet granting 
lihertarian freedom by which humans sometimes resist the divine wilp2 
He goes on to argue that a God with only PK is not in a position to 
guarantee, prior to creation, that anyone would come to faith. "Would 
anyone believe? One could say that God is infinitely resourceful and 
would have started another line like Seth's or called out another Noah. 
Yet how could God know that Plan C would work any better than failed 
Plans A and B? Could God with integrity promise that Seed would over-
come Serpent (Genesis 3:15)? Or would it have been more correct for 
God to say, 'I hope to do everything I can so that Seed will strike 
Serpent's heel?"'33 Clark feels that redemption itself is threatened if God 
lacks foreknowledge-there is too much risk involved otherwise. 
Does either version of simple foreknowledge alleviate the risk of cre-
ating creatures with libertarian freedom? It has already been shown that 
SF does not make creation and providence any less risky than PK. Does 
SF enable God to promise from the beginning that his redemptive plans 
will succeed? No, for the claim that God uses SF to predict the future 
(guarantee success) was shown to fail. Does SF allow God to know 
which of plans A or B or C will succeed? No, as David Basinger correctly 
responds: "A God with [SF] does know what will occur in the actual 
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world-including what humans with indeterministic freedom will freely 
choose to do .... But this means, of course, that before God's creative deci-
sion was made, he did not know with respect to any creative option con-
taining individuals with indeterministic freedom what such individuals 
would freely choose to do if actualized. Thus, he, like a God with PK, 
could only 'gamble' on the fact that a desirable state of affairs would 
come about."34 
"Once" God decides to create this world, then a God with SF can 
"look ahead" to see whether anyone with libertarian freedom will come 
to faith. But if nobody ever trusts God then what God foreknows is that 
his plans have failed. If some people do exercise faith in God then God 
foreknows, from the beginning, that his efforts will meet with success. 
But the reason for the success is not the divine foreknowledge. Rather, 
the reason is that humans freely decided to trust God. Moreover, as has 
been shown, God cannot use this foreknowledge to predict the future 
and so a God with SF is not in a position to guarantee success from the 
beginning. Consequently, a God with SF has no more ability to guaran-
tee the success of his plans than does a God with PK. 
Conclusion 
If this analysis is correct, then SF (either CSF or ISF) affords God no 
greater providential control in these seven areas than does PK. CSF 
appears to stymie divine involvement and, though ISF allows for divine 
responsiveness to his creatures and enables us to read the biblical texJs 
of divine-human dialogue in a more straightforward manner, it results 
in explanations essentially identical to the openness model. In passing, it 
should be noted that the problems encountered in constructing a coher-
ent account of the providential use of SF are also problems for the doc-
trine of divine timeless knowledge. Keith Ward has argued that the 
appeal to timelessness gives "the illusion of control" but actually does 
not enhance providence at al].35 Finally, those who make the common 
claim that SF is useful for providence have not given a plausibile 
account of how this is so. If the supposed values of SF for providence are 
illusory, then the reasons for affirming it are greatly reduced. In which 
case, the "live options" regarding the use of omniscience for providen-
tial interaction with creatures with indeterministic freedom are nar-
rowed to either molinism or openness. 
My preference is to develop an understanding of divine providence from 
a PK view of omniscience where God only foreknows what he, himself 
determines to do. If God is the risk taker which the openness of God view 
affirms then some serious rethinking is in order conceming how God exer-
cises providence. Nevertheless, according to the openness model God is 
supremely loving, wise, good, knowledgeable, and powerful. Hence, God 
can offer us the greatest possible guidance and protection he can given the 
sort of world he chose to create. This God is able to respond to us, dialogue 
with us and supply mercy and grace in time of need (Heb 4:16).36 
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NOTES 
1. Indeterministic freedom is assumed throughout this essay. 
2. God may intend to perform a certain action at a particular time unless 
conditions are such that an alternate plan is warranted. There are some things (e. 
g. the incarnation) which God decrees unilaterally apart from any consideration 
of human action. Hence, I make a distinction between absolute and conditional 
decrees by God. 
3. David P. Hunt, "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," Faith 
and Philosophy 10, 3 (July, 1993), pp. 394-5. 
4. Jack Cottrell, What the Bible Says About God the Ruler (Joplin, MO: College 
Press Publishing, 1984), pp. 208-9. It seems that what Cottrell is actually describ-
ing is closer to Middle Knowledge than SF. 
5. If a God with CSF possesses foreknowledge of his own actions, then the 
problem is to explain how the foreknowledge can be the basis for the actions 
when it already includes the actions. As William Hasker says in his God, Time, and 
Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 63, "[I]t is impossible 
that God should use a foreknowledge derived from the actual occurance of 
future events to determine his own prior actions in the providential governance 
of the world." See also note seven below. 
6. Hunt, "Divine Providence," p. 408. 
7. This problem holds unless, of course, one wishes to say that God sees his 
own actions in his foreknowledge (which, it seems, SF needs to affrim). God 
would then know what he is going to do before he makes up his mind and God 
would be unable to plan, anticipate or decide (see Eleanore Stump and Norman 
Kretzman, "Eternity" Journal of Philosophy, 78, no. 8 [August, 1981]: 446). 
Unfortunately, this calls the divine freedom and omnipotence into question mak-
ing God a prisoner of his omniprescience (see J. R. Lucas, "Foreknowledge and 
the Vulnerability of God," in Godfrey Vesey ed., The Philosophy in Christianity 
[New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989], p. 126). 
8. William P. Alston suggests this possibility in his "Divine-Human 
Dialogue and the Nature of God," Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 1 (Jan. 1985), p. 17; 
Hunt hints at it in his "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," p. 412; 
and William Hasker clearly explains it in his God, Time, and Knowledge, pp. 57-9. 
9. All time related terms used in this discussion are meant in a logical rather 
than temporal fashion. After all, an atemporal deity does not literally have 
"fore" knowledge. 
10. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, revised ed. (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1978), p. 69. 
11. Lorenzo McCabe, The Foreknowledge of God (Cincinnati, OH: Cranston 
and Stowe, 1887), p. 364. See also his Divine Nescience of Future Contingencies a 
Necessity (New York: Phillips and Hunt, 1862). Though verbose McCabe's two 
books contain many of the same arguments being used by contemporary 
defenders of PK. 
12. Cottrell, God the Ruler, p. 214. I do not understand how Cottrell can con-
sistently maintain both that the future is closed for God and that God is able to 
alter that same future. 
13. Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, pp. 57-8. Keith Ward makes the same 
point in his Rational Theology and the Creativity of God (New York, Pilgrim Press, 
1982), p. 152. 
14. The tape metaphor may, itself, be deceiving since it assumes the future is 
available to be known. That is, even if God should stop the tape the rest of the 
future is there to be known and if God knows it is there to be known, then it is 
difficult to understand how God's actions would change anything. 
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Consequently, ISF may not be a legitimate alternative to CSF. I owe this observa-
tion to a referee of this journal. 
15. Although writers such as McCabe and Cottrell do not refer to middle 
knowledge, at times it seems they have something like it in mind. Actually, I 
believe many proponents of SF need middle knowledge to warrant their claims. 
But then, SF will have been forfeited. Interestingly, Arminius affirmed a version 
of middle knowledge. See The Writings of James Arminius, 3 vols., trans. James 
Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1956), 1:248 and Richard A. Muller, God, Creation, 
and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids, Baker, 1991),154-7. 
16. Quoted in McCabe, Foreknowledge of God, p. 25. 
17. See my "Historical Considerations," in Clark Pinnock et. al., The Openness 
of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), pp. 72-75, 91. 
18. If God responds in this way, then election is a bilateral choosing and not 
a unilateral act of God. Moreover, if as God looks ahead in history he does not 
yet know whether, for instance, Saul will come to faith in Jesus, then it makes 
sense for God to encourage him towards salvation. But if God already knows 
that Saul will never come to faith, then what does this make of God's attempts to 
convert him? Are such attempts genuine? It could be argued that God makes 
genuine efforts to save those he knows will never actually come to faith, but 
whatever reasons one adduces for such divine actions, it will not be for the bene-
fit of Saul. McCabe, (Foreknowledge of God, p. 353), asks, "Is it possible to conceive 
of God's putting forth efforts with that burning earnestness which the urgent 
necessities of the case demand, in order to snatch from everlasting death an 
endangered moral agent when he"'is absolutely certain that that agent is going 
forward to endless perdition?" 
19. Phillip Yancy and G. K. Chesterton both assert that God was "coura-
geous" in creating this sort of world. See Yancy, "Cosmic Combat," Christianity 
Today 38, no. 14 (Dec. 12, 1994), p. 21. 
20. C. S. Lewis, "On Special Providences" in Miracles (New York: Macmillan, 
1974), pp. 180-7. 
21. Some proponents of SF speak as though God had gaps in his foreknowl-
edge. For instance, they sometimes speak as though God knows exactly what 
sort of person Abe will become while God does not know whether Abe and 
Mandie actually get married. But if God knows Abe's future character then he 
would also know whether or not they got married. See, for example, David 
Hunt, "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," p. 409. 
22. I am not here addressing the issue of how libertarian freedom affects 
what God does or does not do in answer to such prayers. I am only examining 
how such prayers make sense within the theory of SF. 
23. See my "Historical Considerations," in Clark Pinnock et. al., The 
Openness of God, pp. 69-91. For some Medieval Jewish philosophical reflections 
on the matter see Seymour Feldman, "The Binding of Isaac: A Test-Case of 
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(Sept. 1993), p. 359. 
27. Three times the text says that God gives the signs for the benefit of the 
leaders of Israel-not for Moses' benefit (at least, not for his benefit alone). 
Moreover, God says, if they do not believe you. Terence Fretheim discusses 
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divine uses of "if' in the Hebrew Bible and concludes they are genuine condi-
tionals for God. God's response to Moses' question indicates that not even God 
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Testament Perspective (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), pp. 47-9 and Exodus, 
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rect then both Jonah and Elijah gave false prophecies. I suggest the verse be 
understood as a guiding rule (rather than a universal principle) which does not 
overide the divine freedom to modify the divine judments in favor of mercy 
should God choose to do so. 
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